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Abstract
The Böhm-Bawerk horse markets are assignment markets with homogeneous goods that are
known to have a one-dimensional core. We show here that, although there exist two-sided
assignment games with non-homogeneous products and with a segment as a core, the
Böhm-Bawerk horse markets are the only ones where every submarket also has a segment as
a core.
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Let M be a ¯nite set of buyers, M0 a ¯nite set of sellers and let us denote by m and m0
their cardinalities. We may think of the formal model of assignment games as arising from
a situation where each seller j 2 M0 has an object for sale which he valuates in cj 2 R+
(reservation price of seller j ), being R+ the set of non negative real numbers, while each
buyer i 2 M wants exactly one indivisible object and places a value of hij 2 R+ in the
object o®ered by seller j , hi = (hij)j2M0 . Then, if h = (hi)i2M and c = (cj)j2M0 , a matrix
A = A(h;c) = (aij)(i;j)2M£M0 is de¯ned, where aij = maxfhij¡cj;0g are the potential gains
from the trade between i and j. An assignment market is then a triple (M;M0;A).
A matching ¹ µ M £ M0 between M and M0 is a bijection from some M0 µ M to
some M0
0 µ M0 such that jM0j = jM0
0j = minfjMj;jM0jg. We write (i;j) 2 ¹ as well
as j = ¹(i) and i = ¹¡1(j). We denote the set of matchings between M and M0 by
M(M;M0). We say a buyer i 2 M is not assigned by ¹ if (i;j) 62 ¹ for all j 2 M0 (and
similarly for sellers).
A matching ¹ 2 M(M;M0) is optimal for the two-sided assignment market (M;M0;A)




(i;j)2¹0 aij , and we denote the set of
optimal matchings by M¤
A(M;M0). Given S µ M and T µ M0 , we denote by M(S;T)
and M¤
A(S;T) the set of matchings and optimal matchings of the submarket (S;T;AjS£T)
de¯ned by the subset S of buyers, the subset T of sellers and the restriction of A to S£T .
If S = ; or T = ;, then the only matching is ¹ = ; and by convention
P
(i;j)2; aij = 0.
The above two{sided market can be described by means of a cooperative game (Shapley
and Shubik, 1972) where the player set is M [M0 and the characteristic function is de¯ned
by wA(S [ T) =
P
(i;j)2¹ aij , for any ¹ 2 M¤
A(S;T).
Shapley and Shubik (1972) prove that the core, C(wA), of the assignment game (M [
M0;wA) is nonempty and coincides with the set of stable outcomes. This means that given
any optimal matching ¹ 2 M¤
A(M;M0), a payo® vector (u;v) 2 RM
+ £ RM0
+ is in the core
if ui + vj = aij for all (i;j) 2 ¹, ui + vj ¸ aij for all (i;j) 2 M £ M0 , and the payo® to
unmatched agents is zero.
Moreover, the core has a lattice structure with two special extreme core allocations: the
buyers{optimal core allocation, (u;v), where each buyer attains her maximum core payo®,
and the sellers{optimal core allocation, (u;v), where each seller does.
From Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983) we know that the maximum core payo® of
any player coincides with his marginal contribution:
ui = wA(N) ¡ wA(N n fig) and vj = wA(N) ¡ wA(N n fjg) (1)
for all i 2 M and all j 2 M0 . As a consequence, for each optimally matched pair (i;j),
1the minimum core payo®s are
ui = wA(M [ M0 n fjg) ¡ wA(M [ M0 n fi;jg) and
vj = wA(M [ M0 n fig) ¡ wA(M [ M0 n fi;jg): (2)
The present paper is devoted to the analysis of those assignment games which have a
segment as a core, the segment with extreme points the buyers{optimal and the sellers{
optimal core allocations, that is to say, C(wA) = [(u;v);(u;v)]. We also analyze which are
the assignment markets such that this property is inherited by all the submarkets.
2. Assignment markets with a segment as a core
A well known example of an assignment market with a one-dimensional core is the BÄ ohm-
Bawerk horse market (1891), which is ¯rst studied in 1972 from the viewpoint of game
theory by Shapley and Shubik (see also N¶ u~ nez and Rafels, 2005). In this market, each
seller has one horse for sale and each buyer wishes to buy one horse and places the same
valuation in all the horses available, as they are all alike (we say goods are homogeneous). Let
0 · c1 · c2 · ¢¢¢ · cm0 be the reservation prices of the sellers and h1 ¸ h2 ¸ ¢¢¢ ¸ hm ¸ 0
the valuations of the buyers. If hi < cj , no transaction is possible between these two agents
but whenever hi ¸ cj , agents i and j can trade and obtain a joint pro¯t of hi ¡cj . Thus,
the assignment matrix describing this market is de¯ned by aij = maxfhi ¡ cj;0g.
It is known from Shapley and Shubik (1972) that the core of the BÄ ohm{Bawerk horse
market game consists of a segment, with extreme points the buyers{optimal and the sellers{
optimal core allocations. These authors also point out that the assignment matrix of a
BÄ ohm-Bawerk horse market satis¯es the following property: in each 2 £ 2 submatrix with
nonzero entries, the sums of the diagonals are equal. However, this property is not enough
to characterize the matrices de¯ning a BÄ ohm{Bawerk horse market.
A 2 £ 2 assignment matrix de¯nes a BÄ ohm{Bawerk horse market if and only if either
two optimal matchings exist (h2 ¸ c2 ) or there is only one optimal matching but one of
the optimally matched pairs has a null outcome (h2 < c2 ). Thus, 2 £ 2 matrices de¯ning a










with a11 ¸ a12 + a21 : (3)
It is not di±cult to prove that these are the only 2 £ 2 assignment markets with a
segment as a core. But this is not the case when the market has more than two agents on
each side.









2has a one{dimensional core C(wA1) = [(1;1;1;0;0;0);(0;0;0;1;1;1)], but is not a BÄ ohm{
Bawerk horse market. To see that, notice that from a11 = a21 we deduce that buyers 1 and
2 have the same valuation for the object of seller 1, but this enters in contradiction with
a12 6= a22 .
What is it that characterizes the BÄ ohm-Bawerk horse markets among all assignment
markets with a segment as a core? Notice that any submarket of a BÄ ohm-Bawerk horse
market is also a BÄ ohm-Bawerk horse market and thus it has a segment as a core. On







Next theorem characterizes the BÄ ohm{Bawerk horse markets in terms of its submarkets.
Notice ¯rst that if one side of the market has only one agent, then trivially the market is a
BÄ ohm{Bawerk horse market.
Theorem 1 Let (M; M0; A) be an assignment market with at least two agents on each side.
The following statements are equivalent:
1. (M; M0; A) is a BÄ ohm{Bawerk horse market.
2. Every 2 £ 2 submarket of (M; M0; A) is a BÄ ohm{Bawerk horse market.
3. Every submarket of (M; M0; A) has a segment as a core.
Proof: 1) ) 3) If (M;M0;A) is a BÄ ohm{Bawerk horse market, then all subgames are
also BÄ ohm{Bawerk horse markets and their core is a segment.
3) ) 2) In particular, every 2 £ 2 submarket has a segment as a core, and this implies
every 2 £ 2 submarket is a BÄ ohm-Bawerk horse market.
2) ) 1) Let us assume, without loss of generality, that rows and columns have been
ordered in such a way that a1j ¸ a1j+1 for all j 2 f1;:::;m0 ¡ 1g, ai1 ¸ ai+11 for all
i 2 f1;:::;m ¡ 1g and, moreover, a11 ¸ aij for all i 2 M and j 2 M0 . Notice that this
can always be achieved.
Under the assumption that all 2£2 submatrices de¯ne BÄ ohm{Bawerk markets, we claim
that the above ordering implies that, for all i 2 M and j 2 M0 , aij ¸ aij0 for all j0 ¸ j
and aij ¸ ai0j for all i0 ¸ i.
We prove the ¯rst inequality of the claim (the second one is proved analogously). Take





. As this matrix de¯nes a BÄ ohm{Bawerk
horse market, and because of the given orders in the sets of buyers and sellers, if a1j = 0,




is a BÄ ohm{Bawerk horse market, we deduce that aij0 = 0 and thus aij ¸ aij0 .
If a1j > 0 we will ¯rst see that a1j ¸ aij . As this is obvious when aij = 0, let us assume
aij > 0. Then, since A0 is a BÄ ohm{Bawerk horse market, we obtain a11 + aij = a1j + ai1 ,
which from a11 ¸ ai1 implies a1j ¸ aij .





. If aij0 = 0, then trivially aij ¸ aij0 . If aij0 > 0,
since A00 is a BÄ ohm{Bawerk horse market, a1j + aij0 = aij + a1j0 which, as a1j ¸ a1j0 ,
implies aij ¸ aij0 .
Once proved the claim, we de¯ne valuations for buyers and sellers which show that A is
a BÄ ohm{Bawerk horse market.






which, by assumption, is a BÄ ohm{Bawerk horse market. If
aij > 0, then A0 > 0 and a11 + aij = ai1 + a1j , which implies
maxfhi ¡ cj;0g = maxfai1 ¡ (a11 ¡ a1j);0g = maxfaij;0g = aij :
If aij = 0, then a11 ¸ a1j + ai1 , which means
maxfhi ¡ cj;0g = maxfai1 ¡ (a11 ¡ a1j);0g = 0 = aij : 2
Let us remark that, as a consequence of the above Theorem, we can easily recognize
when a given matrix de¯nes a BÄ ohm-Bawerk horse market just by checking that every 2£2
submarket either has two optimal matchings or its unique optimal matching has a null entry
(see expression (3)). Once that is done, if we reorder rows and columns as in the proof
of Theorem 1, then, hi = ai1 for all i 2 M and cj = a11 ¡ a1j for all j 2 M0 give a
representation of the market as a BÄ ohm-Bawerk horse market.
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